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THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DISPUTE 
CONCERNING GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: 
PRECAUTION MEETS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW  
David A. Wirth*† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 “Precaution” has been an important theme in international relations in 
recent years, especially in those related to the environment and public 
health. The concept of precautionary decision-making has received 
considerable attention in the context of such global environmental 
challenges as stratospheric ozone depletion, climate change, and 
bioengineered food. These issues share a common attribute of scientific 
uncertainty surrounding the likelihood, extent, and severity of future 
impacts. 
 An international exhortation to “precautious” decision-making 
counsels early policy action to avoid uncertain or poorly understood risks. 
Formulated in this manner, precaution as a decision-making paradigm has 
its roots in such common-sense maxims as: “an ounce of prevention is 
worth a pound of cure,” “a stitch in time saves nine,” “look before you 
leap,” and “better to be safe than sorry.” Extrapolated to the level of broad-
gauge public policy, a precautionary perspective encourages prompt, 
vigorous governmental responses to suggestive, but perhaps inconclusive, 
indications of harm.  
 While a precautionary approach may facilitate goals associated with 
mission-oriented public policies designed to protect the environment and 
public health, from a trade perspective precaution as a public policy appears 
less salutary and, indeed, potentially corrosive. In an extreme case, 
operating on a theory of “any port in a storm,” a government unable to 
justify a measure any other way might find a safe harbor by reference to 
precaution. If a trade agreement’s test for the validity of a measure rests on 
science, then inevitably a trade-based inquiry engages the relationship 
between precaution and science. 
 International efforts in a variety of fora have further elaborated 
harmonized good practice standards for precautionary decision-making, and 
in some cases binding legal obligations. These developments in non-trade 
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contexts in turn have played an important role in World Trade Organization 
(WTO) dispute settlement proceedings governed by the WTO Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, most notably 
two disputes initiated against the European Communities concerning 
hormone-treated beef and genetically engineered foods and crops. 
 This Article explores the implications for international trade law of 
domestic and internationally harmonized attempts to respond to the problem 
of scientific uncertainty in public policy decision-making. Accordingly, the 
Article commences by scrutinizing the legal and policy status of precaution 
as a basis for governmental action. International efforts in a variety of fora 
have further elaborated harmonized good practice standards for 
precautionary decision-making, and in some cases, binding legal 
obligations. The Article then analyzes the unusual structural attributes when 
precaution plays a role in trade disputes. The Article goes on to assess the 
role of precaution in the WTO disputes over food safety and agricultural 
quarantines in which it has been litigated and its status adjudicated. Next, 
the Article examines the role of precaution in the WTO panel report on the 
transatlantic biotech dispute, which is unique in a number of ways. Last, the 
Article suggests an alternative principled approach to that taken by WTO 
panels and its Appellate Body, one that is more receptive to the role of 
precaution in governmental decision-making. 
II. PRECAUTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND LAW 
 Precautionary policies by definition involve situations of scientific 
uncertainty. Experience over time with a variety of public policy issues 
related to environment and public health has demonstrated that analytical 
techniques for collecting and interpreting empirical information about the 
natural world—the scientific method—may be less than fully adequate to 
predict the nature and magnitude of future risks.1 The reasons for this are 
numerous. The data set upon which a public policy decision is based may 
be incomplete. More profoundly, the scientific techniques for fully 
assessing the risks presented by a particular scenario may not yet exist. Or 
the underlying nature of the problem itself may be poorly understood, 
frustrating attempts at characterizing either the mechanism or the effects.2 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., European Env’t Agency, Late Lessons From Early Warnings: The Precautionary 
Principle 1896–2000, Environmental Issue Report No. 22, at 11 (2001), available at 
www.eea.europa.eu/Publications/environmental_issue_report_2001_22/Issue_Report_No_22.pdf/View 
(identifying as the purpose of the report seeing if the history discussed can help prevent or minimize the 
impacts of other harmful agents without stifling innovation or compromising science). 
 2. See generally ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 39–46 (2007) (discussing implementation of precautionary principle); 
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 A large number of international instruments of a normative nature now 
articulate expectations for precautionary decision-making. All those 
instruments identify circumstances under which it is desirable for 
governmental decisions to reflect a preference for precautionary action 
under conditions of uncertainty. Textual formulations vary in response to 
the requirements of, and variations in, specific substantive contexts, such as 
global warming or marine pollution.3 To that extent, these instruments can 
be interpreted both individually and collectively as establishing 
harmonized, consensus good practice standards for the application of 
precautionary methodologies to address a wide variety of threats to health 
and the environment. 
 So, too, these instruments demonstrate variations in their institutional 
context and legal force. Because the products from multilateral 
deliberations are driving so much of the debate over precautionary 
perspectives on governmental decision-making, this section examines some 
of the salient international contexts in which precaution has been articulated 
as an approach to formulating public policy. Because of the sheer number 
of references to precaution in international practice, the instruments 
analyzed in this section were chosen to be illustrative as opposed to 
exhaustive.4 
A. Precaution as Non-Binding Guidance 
 The most generally applicable admonition to apply a precautionary 
perspective in governmental decision-making processes appears in Principle 
15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,5 a set of non-
binding recommendations adopted at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), attended by over a hundred 
heads of state or government in 1992. The text of that instrument provides 
                                                                                                                 
JACQUELINE PEEL, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE: ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 
AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 1–2 (2005) (“The complexities of the systems involved and the 
difficulties often encountered in applying conventional scientific methodologies to health and 
environmental problems, mean that it may be impossible to estimate the likelihood and potential 
seriousness of harm with accuracy”).  
 3. See Elizabeth Fisher, Precaution, Precaution Everywhere: Developing a ‘Common 
Understanding’ of the Precautionary Principle in the European Community, 9 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. 
& COMP. L. 7, passim (2002) (demonstrating the flexibility of the precautionary principle across varying 
legal cultures). 
 4. See generally HARALD HOHMANN, PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DUTIES AND PRINCIPLES OF 
MODERN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1994) (analyzing precautionary duties and principles 
used in international law).  
 5.  United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June 
3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.151/5/Rev. 1, 31 ILM. 876, 879 (June 13, 1992). 




In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach 
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.6 
 
This statement, while not legally binding, is not confined to a particular 
subject matter and is therefore quite broad in application. Consequently, 
Rio Principle 15 is probably the most widely accepted benchmark for 
international standards for precautionary decision-making. 
 Other non-binding multilateral instruments address precaution as a 
public policy in specific situations or as applied to specific groups of states. 
The final communiqué of the G-8 summit held in Okinawa in 2000, 
endorses the Codex Alimentarius Commission’s “efforts . . . to achieve 
greater global consensus on how precaution should be applied to food 
safety in circumstances where available scientific information is incomplete 
or contradictory.” 7 A number of non-binding recommendations adopted by 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
contain references to precaution. Among those is a 1990 recommendation 
on integrated pollution prevention and control, which in an appendix 
entitled “Guidance on integrated pollution prevention and control” contains 
the following language under the heading “Essential Policy Aspects”: 
“Certain policies, common to all aspects of environmental protection, are 
essential to an effective integrated approach. These include that . . . [t]he 
absence of complete information should not preclude precautionary action 
to mitigate the risk of significant harm to the environment.” 8 
B. Precaution as Binding Obligation 
 In contrast to the Rio Declaration and other non-binding instruments, 
statements concerning precautionary decision-making in treaties establish 
norms that are legally enforceable under international law. As treaties in 
international law are formed on a consensual theory, their obligations apply 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. 
 7. The G8 Summit, Okinawa, Japan, July 21–23, 2000, G8 Communique Okinawa 2000, 
Kyushu-Okinawa Summit Meeting, ¶ 56 (July 23, 2000) http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/ 
2000okinawa/finalcom.htm. 
 8. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Recommendation of 
the Council on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, OECD Doc. C(90)164 (Jan. 31, 1991). 
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only to those states party to the treaty in question. Second, such statements, 
like the treaties in which they are embedded, tend to be confined to 
relatively discrete subject matter. The number of treaty references to 
precautionary decision-making—of which those set out in this section are 
representative—is now quite large.  
 Significant multilateral conventions adopted alongside the Rio 
Declaration and addressing serious global environmental threats also 
articulate precautionary obligations. The 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the cornerstone of the potentially universal 
regime for addressing the “greenhouse” effect, states that:  
 
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, 
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its 
adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that 
policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible 
cost. 9  
 
While not mentioning precaution by name, the 1992 United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity (Biodiversity Convention) in its 
preamble notes that “where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss 
of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as 
a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat . . . .”10 
 Because the subject matter covered by that agreement is more or less 
coextensive with the WTO dispute on biotech foods and crops, the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,11 an ancillary agreement to the 
Biodiversity Convention, is of particular interest in this context. The 
language on precaution was fiercely contested during the negotiations,12 
which produced a compromise result. Article 1, entitled “Objective,” 
specifies as follows: 
 
In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in 
                                                                                                                 
 9. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849, 854 (1992). 
 10. U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, May 22, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 822 (1992) 
[hereinafter Biodiversity Convention]. 
             11.  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 
39 I.L.M. 1027 [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety]. 
           12.  See, e.g., CHRISTOPH BAIL ET AL., European Union, in The Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety: Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with Environment and Development 166, 176 
(Christoph Bail, Robert Falkner & Helen Marquard eds., 2002) (describing some of the issues the EU 
had in drafting the protocol). 
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Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to 
ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe 
transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting 
from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking 
also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing 
on transboundary movements.13 
 
This instrument also contains a preambular reference “reaffirming the 
precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development.”14 
 The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,15 is 
among the more recent major multilateral agreements to be motivated by a 
precautionary approach. In the preamble to that instrument, the parties 
declare that they “[a]knowledge[e] that precaution underlies the concerns of 
all Parties and is embedded within this Convention.”16 Article 1, entitled 
“Objective,” provides that “[m]indful of the precautionary approach as set 
forth in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, the objective of this Convention is to protect human health 
and the environment from persistent organic pollutants.”17 Article 8, 
addressing the listing of additional chemicals governed by the agreement at 
the initiative of one of the parties, states in paragraph 9 that the Conference 
of the Parties shall act on such a proposal “in a precautionary manner.”18 An 
annex directs parties to take into account considerations of “precaution and 
prevention” in considering best available techniques for preventing or 
reducing releases of chemicals regulated by the agreement.19  
 On a multilateral level, express articulation of precautionary principles 
originated in the context of protection of the marine environment.20 Now 
that it has entered into force, the Protocol to the Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
(London Convention) supersedes the earlier 1972 instrument for parties to 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, supra note 11. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 2256 U.N.T.S. 119 
(entered into force May 17, 2004). 
 16. Id. at pmbl. 
 17. Id. at art. 1. 
 18. Id. at art. 8. 
 19. Id. at Annex C. 
 20. See, e.g., Lothar Gündling, The Status in International Law of the Principle of 
Precautionary Action, 5 INT’L. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 23 (1990) (discussing the 
considerable role the principle of precautionary action played in the protection policy for the North Sea). 
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both agreements. 21  Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Protocol specifies that: 
 
In implementing this Protocol, Contracting Parties shall apply a 
precautionary approach to environmental protection from 
dumping of wastes or other matter whereby appropriate 
preventive measures are taken when there is reason to believe 
that wastes or other matter introduced into the marine 
environment are likely to cause harm even when there is no 
conclusive evidence to prove a causal relation between inputs and 
their effects.22  
 
The Protocol is constructed around a precautionary theory of regulation 
expressly articulated in the text which, in contrast to the 1972 London 
Convention, prohibits ocean dumping altogether unless the activity is 
specifically authorized by the new agreement. 
C. Precaution as a Principle  
 Over time the concept of “general principles” has come to play an 
increasingly prominent role in international environmental law and policy: 
 
Although they have an analytical significance beyond any one 
international instrument, many of these principles are collected 
and codified in the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development from the 1992 U[nited] N[ations] Conference on 
Environment and Development. Unlike some other non-binding 
authorities, principles of international environmental law are not 
primarily intended expressly to establish normative standards. 
Rather, these principles are overarching aspirational precepts 
identified as part of a comprehensive and unifying architecture 
that identifies the direction in which international law should 
progressively evolve. Principles of international environmental 
law consequently are equally relevant to the development of 
treaties, customary law, and non-binding norms.23 
 
As the term is used in the field, principles are not necessarily binding 
customary law nor are they mandatory treaty obligations, although under 
some circumstances they could be either or both. Rather, principles of 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1 (1997).  
 22. Id. at 9. 
 23. David A. Wirth, Hazardous Substances and Activities, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 394, 398 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).  
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international environmental law are widely accepted thematic postulates 
that inform more substantive, operative norms, whether obligatory or non-
binding in character. To that extent, principles of international 
environmental law operate to shape or inform particularized substantive 
decisions or more specific rules. While some of these axioms may have 
matured to the point of acceptance as binding custom, the status of others as 
lex ferenda in theory does not attenuate their applicability as meta-level 
principles. The utility of a principle in this sense is independent of its 
precise legal status; its power, rather, derives from widespread acceptance 
of the principle and its potential for broad application to a variety of more 
particularized circumstances. 
 There is considerable scholarly commentary concerning the utility of 
general principles of international environmental law.24 Principles in this 
sense play an important role in non-binding declarations such as the Rio 
Declaration and have been incorporated into a number of prominent 
multilateral treaties in recent years.25 The Treaty on European Union 
expressly includes a provision articulating principles of supranational 
environmental law.26 Principles of international environmental law have 
featured prominently in decisions of international tribunals27 and in a 
number of judicial opinions from a variety of jurisdictions.28 An established 
canon of principles of international environmental law and policy can now 
be identified, including: (1) a duty to refrain from causing transboundary 
environmental harm; (2) a principle of preventive action; (3) a principle of 
cooperation; (4) a principle of sustainable development; (5) the polluter-
                                                                                                                 
 24.  See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
187 (3d ed. 2012) (enumerating and discussing general principles); Alexandre Charles Kiss & Dinah 
Shelton, International Environmental Law 86–88 (3rd ed. 2004) (discussing “General Principles” of 
international law); Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A 
Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 501 (1993) (contrasting developing countries’ views with those 
of developed countries such as the United States).  
 25. E.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 9, at 854–55; 
Biodiversity Convention, supra note 10, at 824; Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area art. 2, Apr. 9–Sept. 24, 1992, 1507 U.N.T.S. 167 (entered into force 
Jan. 17, 2000); Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes art. 2, Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269; Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents pmbl., Mar. 17 1992, 2105 U.N.T.S. 457. 
 26.  Treaty on European Union, art. 21(2)(d), 2012 O.J. (C83) 29. 
 27.  See generally International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases 
(New Zealand & Australia v. Japan), 38 I.L.M. 1624, 1638, 1643 (1999) (discussing international 
environmental law in separate opinions); Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary 
v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 88 (Sept. 25, 1997) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry) 
(discussing sustainable development and its relation to international law and environmental disputes). 
 28.  E.g., M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors., (2002) 2 S.C.R. 963 (India); Leatch v Nat’l 
Parks & Wildlife Serv. [1993] 81 NSWLEC 270 (Austl.); Case C-2/90, Re Imports of Waste: EC 
Comm’n v. Belgium 1992 E.C.R. I-4431 (Eur. Union).  
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pays principle; and (6) a principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities.29 The “precautionary principle” understood in this manner 
occupies a prominent position in the hierarchy.30  
III. PRECAUTIONARY POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 Precaution as a principle or approach to addressing international 
environmental and public health threats is clearly intended to expand the 
“toolbox” of methodologies intended to accomplish salutary public policy 
goals—whether at the domestic level or as an international strategy—in 
laying the foundation for unilateral or coordinated multilateral 
governmental action. In the context of international trade law and policy, 
however, precaution appears in a different posture that may be considerably 
less beneficial, to the point of potentially undermining the mission-oriented 
goal of trade liberalization. 
A. Precaution as a Structural Challenge to Trade Liberalization 
 Trade liberalization, like policies that promote environmental 
protection, is intended to enhance human welfare. Free trade agreements 
achieve this goal in a manner that is structurally different from the 
international environmental instruments identified above. The form of 
international legal requirements for trade on the one hand and environment 
on the other mirror these disparate policy approaches. Trade agreements 
encourage liberalized or free trade by limiting governmental intrusion into 
what otherwise would be a free market. International obligations on trade 
are consequently almost exclusively “negative” in the sense that they place 
constraints on governmental action. From an environmental point of view, 
this phenomenon is the equivalent of deregulation—in the sense of reducing 
the level of governmental intrusion in the market—and trade agreements by 
virtue of their negative obligations are inherently deregulatory. 
 Environmental protection, by contrast, anticipates affirmative 
governmental interventions in the marketplace to offset market failures. 
Obligations in trade agreements proscribe certain governmental behaviors 
that impede trade, while environmental agreement regulations prescribe 
                                                                                                                 
 29. SANDS ET AL., supra note 24.  
 30. Peter Sand, The Precautionary Principle: A European Perspective, 6 HUMAN & 
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 445–46 (2000) (quoting David Freestone, The Precautionary Principle, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 36 (Robin Churchill & David Freeman eds., 
1991)). But see Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle? 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10790, 
10799 (2001) (discussing problems with “the precautionary principle” in that there is no one principle). 
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governmental actions to protect public health and ecosystems. It is 
important to note that international trade agreements, by their terms, do not 
mandate any minimum standards for protection of the environment or 
human health. Rather, these instruments define zones of appreciation in 
which states are free to act if they choose to regulate in these areas, and 
establish constraints designed to prohibit regulatory choices that do not 
conform to minimum requirements.  
 At a more specific level, trade agreements focus on environmental 
measures as potential impediments to international trade. The task from the 
point of view of trade policy is consequently to distinguish between those 
measures ostensibly intended to promote environmental or public health 
goals that are legitimate exercises of governmental regulatory powers and 
those that are, by contrast, pretexts for protectionism. Free trade agreements 
accomplish this goal by articulating rules designed to clarify the line 
dividing these two categories. The dispute settlement process then operates 
as an adversarial, quasi-adjudicatory setting in which to apply those rules, 
requiring the respondent state to justify its exercise of governmental 
authority in response to an assertion of inconsistency by the challenging 
state. This is a very different posture from a multilateral negotiation on an 
issue such as climate change, which is designed to overcome collective 
action problems by reference to at least some minimal level of international 
agreement about the nature of the underlying threats. In the area of climate 
change, for instance, the scientific predicate for action might be established 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), whose mandate 
is to synthesize available policy-relevant science in a manner intended to 
support and inform the policy debate. 
 Although these structural features are common to all trade-based 
challenges to environmental, health, and safety regulations, the tension is 
particularly acute for those based on a theory of precaution. To the extent 
that a challenged measure appears to be the result of inferences that are less, 
as opposed to more, susceptible to validation by reference to objective tests 
of legitimacy, the vulnerability of the measure to criticism as motivated by 
protectionist intent increases. More specifically, from a trade point of view 
the precautionary exhortation to anticipate and prevent harm in response to 
uncertain science appears to be an invitation to overregulation and hence 
abuse. This concern plays out in parallel fashion in the dispute settlement 
process, in which a precautionary justification regulation gives the 
appearance of an argument of last resort for a respondent state that cannot 
justify a measure by reference to “hard” or ostensibly “sound” science. 
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B. Precaution in Transatlantic Relations 
 The genetically modified organism (GMO) debate is but one instance 
of the extent to which precaution has been a particularly delicate question in 
transatlantic relations, particularly those concerning disparities in regulatory 
approaches. Trade disputes over non-tariff barriers frequently arise from 
differences in national regulatory approaches.31 From this point of view, 
international responses of various kinds, including regulatory instruments 
such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety32 to the United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity,33 can be considered consequences or 
artifacts of attempts by national governments to harmonize domestic 
regulatory strategies.34 Trade in, and market access for, genetically 
engineered products can then be understood as one of the principal driving 
forces behind much of the international debate.35 In the case of GMOs, this 
feature is particularly pronounced, as the European Union has probably the 
strictest regime for pre-market approval of genetically engineered foods and 
crops,36 whereas the United States’ regulatory approach is relatively less 
rigorous.37  
 Especially in the field of environment and public health, there has been 
extensive legislative and policy activity at the Community level over the 
past quarter century or so.38 At the same time, the United States has had 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See, e.g., Michael Cardwell, Introduction, in THE REGULATION OF GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED ORGANISMS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 1, 2–3 (Luc Boddiguel & Michael Cardwell eds., 
2010) (providing examples of trade disputes arising from differing regulatory schemes); Ilona Cheyne, 
Precaution and International Trade in Food and Other Agricultural Products, 2009 EUR. FOOD & FEED 
L.REV. 47 (2009) (examining international trade disputes arising from restrictions based on the 
precautionary principle). 
 32. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, supra note 11, at 1030–33 (requiring parties to obtain 
“advance informed agreement” in the form of the express consent of the government of a state of import 
before exportation of living modified organisms can take place). 
 33. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 10. 
 34. See Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 47, 48 
(2001) (“assess[ing] the strengths and limits of existing international law and structures in this area, 
and . . . suggest[ing] a means for augmenting the current structures to make them more effective”). 
 35. See generally MARK A. POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2009) (discussing the 
difference in approach taken by the US and EU with respect to GMOs). 
 36. See generally MARIA LEE, EU REGULATION OF GMOS : LAW AND DECISION-MAKING FOR 
A NEW TECHNOLOGY (2008) (discussing the difference in approach taken by the US and EU with 
respect to GMOs). 
 37. See generally Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: 
Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. R. 2167 
(2004) (identifying several lapses in the U.S. regulatory regime). 
 38. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM 
(2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000); see also Sand, supra note 30, at 449 (describing how “precautionary 
policies also made their appearance in the emerging quasi-federal law of the European Union”). 
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more of a deregulatory orientation, relying on existing policies or even 
rolling back some environmental and public health protections.39 As the 
European Union has progressively expanded to twenty-seven Member 
States, it has become more of an alternative power center in the area of 
environmental regulation.40 Regulatory divergences, which naturally tend to 
metamorphose into trade disputes, are consequently increasingly common 
and less amenable to diplomatic pressure, especially with the advent of 
greater transparency and more formal procedures at the Community level, 
such as the Parliamentary co-decision process. The stage has consequently 
been set for a series of flash points over regulatory policies, with precaution 
not infrequently at the center of the storm.41 
 The situation is doubly confounded by widespread international 
agreement on the utility of precautionary approaches in overcoming 
collective action problems at the multilateral level on such global 
environmental and public health threats as depletion of the stratospheric 
ozone layer. In situations characterized by a multilateral consensus, 
precaution is viewed as a salutary perspective, as evidenced by Rio 
Principle 15. As a result, the problem is largely confined to a single state’s 
reliance on precaution as a regulatory theory to justify unilateral, domestic 
measures—or, as in the case of the European Community (EC), 
supranational policies and legislation. One might think of this as 
precaution’s potentially corrosive alter ego, which invites trade disputes. 
This cognitive dissonance is clear in a White House Declaration on 
Environment and Trade, adopted during the Clinton presidency: 
 
Precaution is an essential element of the US regulatory system 
given that regulators often have to act on the frontiers of 
knowledge and in the absence of full scientific certainty. . . . We 
will insist that this ability to take precautionary action be 
maintained in order to achieve our environmental objectives. At 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See, e.g., Ragnar E. Lofstedt & David Vogel, The Changing Character of Consumer and 
Environmental Regulation: A Comparison of Europe and the United States, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 399, 
passim (2001) (hypothesizing "flip-flop" in positions of U.S. and EC with respect to regulatory rigor 
between 1970s and present). 
 40. David A. Wirth, The EU’s New Impact on American Environmental Regulation, FLETCHER 
F. WORLD AFF., Summer 2007, at 91, 97–98. 
 41. See generally PEEL, supra note 2 (discussing the embrace of the precautionary principle in 
the US); DAVID VOGEL, THE POLITICS OF PRECAUTION: REGULATING HEALTH, SAFETY, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2012) (listing and describing several 
examples of differing U.S. and European regulations); Jonathan B. Wiener, The Rehetoric of Precaution, 
in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 
4 (Jonathan B. Wiener et al. eds., 2011) (discussing controversies precaution has caused between the 
United States and Europe). 
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the same time, precaution must be exercised as part of a science-
based approach to regulation, not a substitute for such an 
approach. In this connection, the term precaution must not be 
used as a guise for trade protectionist measures as this would 
have the effect of casting doubt upon, and even undermining, 
environmental as well as trade policy objectives.42 
 
At the level of principled regulatory policy, this tension has played out 
against the background of the familiar risk assessment/risk management 
distinction.43 Both the United States and the European Union agree that 
precaution is appropriate as a risk management tool. In other words, it is 
appropriate for public officials to choose a “precautious” or highly 
protective risk management measure in response to a scientific analysis 
contained in a risk assessment. The EC has tended to expand this 
perspective into the risk assessment stage as well.44 The United States, in 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Press Release, The White House, White House Policy Declaration on Environment and 
Trade (Nov. 16, 1999), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/11/1999-11-16-fact-sheet-on-policy-
declaration-on-environment-and-trade.html. 
 43. An influential publication has described the distinction as follows: 
 
  We use risk assessment to mean the characterization of the potential adverse 
health effects of human exposures to environmental hazards. Risk assessments 
include several elements: description of the potential adverse health effects based 
on an evaluation of results of epidemiologic, clinical, toxicologic, and 
environmental research; extrapolation from those results to predict the type and 
estimate the extent of health effects in humans under given conditions of 
exposure; judgments as to the number and characteristics of persons exposed at 
various intensities and durations; and summary judgments on the existence and 
overall magnitude of the public-health problem. Risk assessment also includes 
characterization of the uncertainties inherent in the process of inferring risk. 
 
  The term risk assessment is often given narrower and broader meanings than we 
have adopted here. For some observers, the term is synonymous with quantitative 
risk assessment and emphasizes reliance on numerical results. Our broader 
definition includes quantification, but also includes qualitative expressions of risk. 
Quantitative estimates of risk are not always feasible, and they may be eschewed 
by agencies for policy reasons. Broader uses of the term than ours also embrace 
analysis of perceived risks, comparisons of risks associated with different 
regulatory strategies, and occasionally analysis of the economic and social 
implications of regulatory decisions—functions that we assign to risk 
management. 
 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE 
PROCESS 18 (1983).  
 44. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, ¶ 4, COM 
(2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000) (“The precautionary principle is particularly relevant to the management of 
risk.”). 
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response, has insisted on “sound” science in the risk assessment stage.45 
This debate leaves unresolved the question of whether precaution can be 
accommodated within the framework of a risk assessment/risk management 
approach to regulation, or whether it is an alternative decision model.46 
Even the language used to characterize precaution’s role in policymaking 
has become fraught, with the United States objecting to Europeans’ use of 
the word “principle,” and insisting instead that precaution is an 
“approach.”47 Not coincidentally, these differences in perspective track the 
disciplines in the principal WTO authority on the subject, the Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary, and Phytosanitary standards (SPS 
Agreement).48 
IV. PRECAUTION IN WTO RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE 
 The SPS Agreement49 is the most readily apparent setting in which 
precaution would be expected to play a role in WTO jurisprudence. Indeed, 
precaution has either explicitly or implicitly played a role in each of the five 
major disputes initiated under that agreement in which precaution was 
litigated, including that addressing GMOs.50 
 
A. Text of the SPS Agreement 
 The SPS Agreement governs measures applied to protect the life or 
health of humans, animals, or plants from pests, disease-causing organisms, 
                                                                                                                 
 45.  Ludwig Krämer, The Roots of Divergence: A European Perspective, in GREEN GIANTS?: 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 68 (Norman J. Vig & 
Michael G. Faure eds., 2004). 
 46. See generally PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND PREVENTIVE PUBLIC POLICY 
xv (Joel Tickner ed., 2002) (examining how environmental science relates to precautionary preventive 
decisions). 
 47. Krämer, supra note 45, at 63.  
             48. World Trade Organization Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
 49. Id. See generally LUKASZ GRUSZCZYNSKI, REGULATING HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISKS UNDER WTO LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SPS AGREEMENT (2010) (questioning the 
relevance of the precautionary principle under the SPS Agreement); JOANNE SCOTT, THE WTO 
AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES: A COMMENTARY (2007) (examining the 
relationship between the precautionary principle and the SPS agreement). 
 50. Science and precaution feature as well in the basic principles of nondiscrimination set out 
in GATT 1994, although to date less explicitly than in the SPS Agreement. See David A. Wirth, The 
Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 818, 839 
(1994) (noting that “the Uruguay Round may well have incorporated the precautionary principle into the 
international trade regime more generally”). 
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additives, contaminants, and toxins. Consequently, the agreement 
disciplines or governs both food safety measures and agricultural 
quarantines. The core of the SPS text is a series of science-based 
disciplines. An SPS measure that is not based on international standards 
must be supported by “a scientific justification” (Article 3.3).51 A 
challenged measure must be “based on scientific principles” (Article 2.2), 
must not be “maintained without sufficient scientific evidence” (Article 
2.2), and the regulatory process leading to the measure must “take into 
account available scientific evidence” (Article 5.2).52 A central feature of 
the SPS Agreement, found in Article 5.1, is a requirement for a risk 
assessment, and the principal operative test in the agreement is the need for 
the measure to be “based on” that risk assessment.53 The SPS Agreement 
consequently codifies requirements for an approach to regulation roughly 
commensurate with the risk assessment/risk management duality.54 
 The word “precaution” does not appear in the text of the SPS 
Agreement. If precaution might be acceptable as a public policy within the 
framework of the regulatory approach established in the Agreement, then 
precaution likely would be considered acceptable within the architecture of 
the regulatory approach set out in the Agreement. In other words, to the 
extent that precaution is consistent with the SPS Agreement’s disciplines on 
domestic regulatory activity, at least in principle there is no need for the 
Agreement expressly to authorize a precautionary approach. Alternatively, 
precautionary formulations such as Rio Principle 15 might serve as an 
additional source of law or an aid to interpretation of the SPS Agreement. 
 Without identifying it as expressly precautionary, Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement incorporates policies similar to those underlying 
precautionary approaches:  
 
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a 
Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures on the basis of available pertinent information, 
including that from the relevant international organizations as 
well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other 
Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain 
the additional information necessary for a more objective 
                                                                                                                 
 51. SPS Agreement, supra note 48, at 70. 
 52. Id. at 71. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 69. But see FISHER, supra note 2, at 187 (Appellate Body in EC-Hormones, infra note 
56, rejected strict compartmentalization rejected strict compartmentalization of risk assessment/risk 
management distinction accepted by panel). 
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assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.55 
 
While expressing a somewhat different formulation than the standard 
precautionary exhortation found in Rio Principle 15, Article 5.7, depending 
on its interpretation, could serve as a vehicle for introducing a precautionary 
element into the SPS Agreement's decision rubric. 
B. The Beef Hormones Dispute 
 The relationship between precaution and the SPS Agreement was 
expressly litigated in the first dispute initiated under the SPS Agreement, a 
challenge by the United States and Canada to the European Communities’ 
prohibition on the sale of imported and domestically manufactured meat 
and meat products derived from cattle treated with three natural and three 
synthetic growth-promoting hormones.56 This dispute was hardly a surprise, 
coming as it did after years of transatlantic tensions over the hormone ban. 
Indeed, the inclusion of the SPS Agreement as a component of the Uruguay 
Round was motivated in large measure as a generic effort to address the 
EC’s across-the-board hormone ban, which did not appear to be susceptible 
to challenge by reference to the non-discrimination tests in General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947.57 In the process, the WTO 
adopted rules addressing not just this situation, but a variety of others 
including both food safety measures and agricultural quarantines. 
 In response to the challenging parties’ accusation that the hormone ban 
suffered from a flimsy scientific justification, the EC relied in part on the 
precautionary principle to defend the challenged measure. As discussed in 
section III.A above, this is precisely the structural and procedural posture in 
which one would expect to encounter precaution in a free trade agreement 
designed to identify and eliminate unjustified barriers to market access. 
This argument consequently presented first the panel, and subsequently the 
Appellate Body, with the need to articulate the relationship between the 
precautionary principle and the SPS Agreement. 
 The Appellate Body might have attempted to harmonize normative 
standards for precautionary decision-making with the SPS Agreement, 
giving life to both by interpreting the Agreement in light of those standards. 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id. at 72. 
 56. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter EC-
Hormones]. 
            57.  Id. ¶ 15. 
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If precaution were understood as having matured to binding custom, then 
the SPS Agreement and the customary norm could exist simultaneously as 
sources of law to be applied in the WTO dispute settlement process. 
 Alternatively, if precaution is a principle of law, but is not a fortiori 
binding on the parties to the dispute, the precautionary principle might still 
have been applied as a guiding precept. Consistent with that status, the SPS 
Agreement could be interpreted in a manner consistent with the principle. 
Even if precaution were nothing more than an international good practice 
standard—consistent with a view of precaution as lex ferenda—that non-
binding guidance could still be available as an aid to interpretation of the 
SPS Agreement, especially to the extent that precaution is an appropriate 
component of domestic regulatory processes disciplined by the Agreement. 
 WTO objectives and principles also could serve as an entry point for 
harmonizing the science-based principles of the SPS Agreement and 
precautionary approaches. The preamble to the Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization refers to “the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so . . . .”58 “Sustainable development” was the central 
theme around which the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) meeting was organized only a few years before 
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and at which the Rio Declaration was 
adopted.59 Precautionary decision-making is a component of strategies for 
sustainable development.60 Trade liberalization, as indicated by the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO, is consequently but one facet of a global 
agenda of sustainable development, which includes both market access and 
precautionary decision-making as part of the larger strategy.  
 In any event, the Appellate Body’s report in the dispute61 adopted a 
contrary approach.62 The Appellate Body first distinguished between 
precaution as a principle of international environmental law on the one hand 
and general international law on the other. Regardless of its status in 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl. ¶ 1, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 15 (1994). 
             59. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 5, at 876. 
 60. See, e.g., M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors., (2002) 2 S.C.R. 963, 965 (India) (“The 
two essential features of sustainable development are (a) the precautionary principle and (b) the polluter 
pays principle.”). 
 61. EC-Hormones, supra note 56, ¶¶ 186–87. 
 62. Cf. Reinhard Quick & Andreas Bluthner, Has the Appellate Body Erred? An Appraisal and 
Criticism of the Ruling in the WTO Hormones Case, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 603, 624 (1999) (analyzing the 
Appellate Body’s decision not to apply the precautionary principle as binding customary international 
law).  
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international environmental law, stated the Appellate Body, the 
precautionary principle’s vigor as a matter of general international law was 
uncertain.63 The Appellate Body then noted that precaution “finds 
reflection” in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.64 Precautionary elements 
also appear in Article 3.3, permitting a Member to adopt standards more 
rigorous than those in multilaterally agreed minima, consistent with a 
Member’s own chosen appropriate level of protection.65 The Appellate 
Body observed, moreover, that the SPS Agreement’s test of scientific 
sufficiency itself reflects the wide acceptance of governmental regulation to 
protect the public from “risks of irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage 
to human health.”66 Last, the Appellate Body noted the need to apply the 
SPS Agreement consistently with ordinary approaches to treaty 
interpretation.67 Without necessarily closing the door to an approach in a 
future case that might harmonize the SPS Agreement’s scientific disciplines 
with the precautionary principle, particularly if it were to acquire greater 
international legal force, the Appellate Body invited the inference that 
WTO members had contracted out of such a standard in the SPS 
Agreement.68 
 A preliminary analytical question, indirectly alluded to by the 
Appellate Body, is the extent to which sources of law or other non-binding 
authorities extrinsic to WTO agreements are available as aids to 
interpretation of WTO rules. At the time this was, and to some extent still 
is,69 a controversial approach. Subsequent to the EC-Hormones report, the 
                                                                                                                 
 63. EC-Hormones, supra note 56, ¶ 123. 
 64. The Appellate Body also noted that “there is no need to assume that Article 5.7 exhausts 
the relevance of a precautionary principle. It is reflected also in the sixth paragraph of the preamble and 
in Article 3.3.”  Id. ¶ 124. The Appellate Body has since elaborated its interpretation of Article 5.7 to a 
considerably greater extent with an interpretation that diverges to a considerable extent from a standard 
formulation of precaution. See, infra, Section IV.C. 
 65. EC-Hormones, supra note 56, ¶ 124. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, for instance, directs that a treaty should 
be interpreted according to the plain meaning of its terms, consistent with the agreement’s objects and 
purposes. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
          68.   At least one commentator has argued that measures based on a public policy of precaution 
should survive scrutiny under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, whose structure is 
similar to that of the SPS Agreement. JOAKIM ZANDER, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE 45 (2010). 
 69. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
333, 342 (1999) (“The mandate to WTO dispute resolution panels, to the Appellate Body, and to the 
Dispute Settlement Body is clear: apply (directly) only WTO law.”). Contra JOOST PAUWELYN, 
CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2003) (discussing the extrinsic sources of law cited by the defense in the US-
Shrimp and EC-Hormones disputes and the need to maintain unity and a secure framework in 
international trade). See also Jan McDonald, Tr(e)ading Cautiously: Precaution in WTO Decision-
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Appellate Body in a number of disputes has relied on both binding and non-
binding sources of international law in a similar context. Most notably in 
the environmental context, the Appellate Body in its report on the U.S.-
Shrimps dispute70 cited the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea and the Biodiversity Convention to frame its interpretation of the term 
“natural resources” in Article XX(g). The Appellate Body also referenced 
Agenda 21, a non-binding action program adopted at the Rio conference.71  
 Perhaps most importantly, it is by no means apparent that Article 5.7 of 
the SPS Agreement embodies policies that track international standards for 
precaution. That provision applies “[i]n cases where relevant scientific 
evidence is insufficient.”72 Particularly in countries in which governmental 
regulation is subject to judicial review, a scientific predicate for regulation 
characterized as “insufficient” generally would suggest that the measure 
would not withstand scrutiny by a neutral third party such as a court.73 
Presumably for reasons like this, Rio Principle 15 and other authorities 
speak of “lack of full scientific certainty,”74 the “absence of complete 
information” as in the 1990 OECD recommendation,75 or “no conclusive 
evidence to prove a causal relation” as in the London Protocol.76 Phrased in 
these terms, the justification for policy action is considerably clearer. 
 Assuming that it applies, Article 5.7 authorizes only provisional 
application of a precautionary measure while the Member “seek[s] to obtain 
the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of 
risk.”77 Here the SPS Agreement and the precautionary principle plainly 
diverge. While precaution may be applicable to situations in which research 
is ongoing, the intent of the precautionary principle is broader than that 
                                                                                                                 
Making, in IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS 160, 166 
(Elizabeth Fisher et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the role of the precautionary principle in WTO 
proceedings). See generally Jeffrey Lagomarsino, WTO Dispute Settlement and Sustainable 
Development: Legitimacy Through Holistic Treaty Interpretation, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 545 (2011) 
(pointing out that public international law is sometimes used to fill gaps in WTO treaties). 
 70. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, art. 55 ¶ 130(Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S.-Shrimps]. 
 71. Id. 
 72. SPS Agreement, supra note 48, at 72. 
 73. See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (denial of 
waiver for new motor vehicle emissions reduction standards in U.S. invalidated after deferential review 
of substance of scientific issues); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(U.S. new source performance standard for Portland cement plants invalidated after deferential review 
of substance of scientific issues); RONALD BRICKMAN ET AL., CONTROLLING CHEMICALS: THE POLITICS 
OF REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 114–15 (1985). 
            74.  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 5, at 879. 
            75.  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, supra note 8. 
             76.  Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter, supra note 21, at 9. 
 77. SPS Agreement, supra note 48, at 72. 
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category of situations. As discussed in section II above, precautionary 
public policies are additionally intended to address situations of 
fundamental or irreducible uncertainties in which the state of scientific 
knowledge is not yet sufficiently advanced to the extent that a risk can be 
fully characterized. In such a situation, a precautionary approach could 
counsel maintaining a measure despite scientific uncertainty which cannot 
be immediately resolved. Article 5.7 consequently addresses only a subset 
of the situations in which a precautionary methodology could find 
application and is at most a temporary safe harbor, as elaborated in the 
Appellate Body’s subsequent jurisprudence discussed in the following 
section. 
C. The Quarantine Disputes and SPS Article 5.7 
 Subsequent to the EC-Hormones decision the Appellate Body 
addressed three disputes challenging agricultural quarantines: Australia’s 
ban on importing fresh chilled or frozen salmon to protect the domestic 
salmon population from disease;78 Japan’s requirement to test each variety 
of certain agricultural products to protect against the introduction of 
coddling moths;79 and Japan’s prohibition on importing mature, 
symptomless apples in an effort to prevent the spread of fire blight, a plant 
disease.80 
 None of these reports revisited the legal applicability of precaution 
addressed by the Appellate Body’s analysis in EC-Hormones.  In that 
dispute, the EC relied on normative standards for precaution as a principle 
extrinsic to the SPS Agreement, such as the Rio Declaration, and did not 
litigate the applicability of Article 5.7.81 Consequently, the Appellate 
Body’s discussion of Article 5.7 in EC-Hormones was indirect, triggered by 
the EC’s reference to the precautionary principle, and might plausibly be 
characterized as obiter dictum.82 In the quarantine cases, by contrast, the 
Appellate Body addressed the requirements of Article 5.7 explicitly.83 In 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Panel Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, ¶¶ 
2.11, 2.14 (Jun. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Australia-Salmon]. 
 79. Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, 
WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Japan-Varietals]. 
 80. Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, 
WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Japan-Apples]. 
 81. EC-Hormones, supra note 56, ¶ 124. 
 82. Id. (reversing Panel’s findings under article 5.7, citing “numerous flaws . . . in the Panel’s 
analysis”).  
 83. See generally Rosie Cooney & Andrew T.F. Lang, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Adaptive 
Governance and International Trade, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523 (2007) (discussing approaches taken by 
the Appellate Body in determining the requirements of Article 5.7). 
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Australia-Salmon, Australia did not expressly identify Article 5.7 as a 
justification for the measure, but the Appellate Body commented on that 
provision as relevant to the dispute.84 In the two disputes challenging 
Japanese measures, Japan-Varietals and Japan-Apples, the applicability of 
Article 5.7 was litigated more actively. In each dispute, the Appellate Body 
concluded that Article 5.7 was inapplicable.85 
 The Appellate Body’s report in Australia-Salmon established that 
Article 5.7 is the only “exception to the obligation to base sanitary measures 
on a risk assessment.”86 In Japan-Varietals the Appellate Body referred to 
Article 5.7 as a “qualified exemption from the obligation under Article 2.2 
not to maintain SPS measures without sufficient scientific evidence,” noting 
that “[a]n overly broad and flexible interpretation of that obligation would 
render Article 5.7 meaningless.”87 Accordingly, the threshold for a Member 
to take advantage of the exceptions in Article 5.7 would appear to be high. 
The Appellate Body appears to view Article 5.7 as a potential escape hatch 
whose operation would relieve WTO Members of the need to comply with 
the disciplines in the SPS Agreement, and consequently adopted a 
presumption against its application. This approach is reminiscent of the 
GATT-era approach to the Article XX exceptions, which stressed their 
narrow scope and limited availability.88 It is important to note, however, 
that a narrow interpretation of Article 5.7 is not necessarily inconsistent 
with a greater level of receptivity to precautionary approaches employed 
within the framework of the other obligations in the SPS Agreement. 
 Relying on the text of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body in 
Japan-Varietals established a four-prong test to determine whether a 
measure satisfies the requirements of Article 5.7 as a limited  “safe harbor.” 
Under the test: (1) the situation must be one “where relevant scientific 
information is insufficient;” (2) the measure must be based on “available 
pertinent information;” (3) the Member maintaining the measure must 
“seek[] to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk;” and (4) the Member must “review[] the 
measure . . . within a reasonable period of time.”89 All four requirements 
must be satisfied for Article 5.7 to apply, and failure to meet any one means 
that Article 5.7 is unavailable as a justification for the challenged measure. 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Australia-Salmon, supra note 78, ¶ 8.57. 
 85. See Japan-Varietals, supra note 79, ¶ 143(b); Japan-Apples, supra note 80, ¶ 243(c). 
 86. Australia-Salmon, supra note 78, ¶ 8.57. 
 87. Japan-Varietals, supra note 79, ¶ 80 (emphasis in original). 
 88. See generally Wirth, supra note 40 (discussing the directional change of environmental 
influence from the U.S. influencing Europe to the current European influence on the U.S.). 
 89. Japan-Varietals, supra note 79, ¶ 89 (quoting SPS agreement, art. 5.7, supra note 48). 
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 The panel in Japan-Varietals examined the challenged measure on the 
basis of all four factors, but the Appellate Body based its conclusions only 
on the last two, apparently reasoning that because these conditions were not 
satisfied there was no need to examine the others.90 With respect to the 
requirement to seek additional information, the Appellate Body observed 
that the Member’s investigational inquiry must collect “information . . . 
germane to conducting such a risk assessment,” presumably so as to satisfy 
the other requirements of the SPS Agreement.91 The Appellate Body 
affirmed the panel’s conclusion that Japan’s subsequent research agenda did 
not satisfy this requirement because it was not targeted at preparing “a more 
objective risk assessment.”92 
 With respect to the requirement to conduct further studies within a 
reasonable time, the Appellate Body stated that the availability of the 
exception “has to be established on a case-by-case basis and depends on the 
specific circumstances of each case, including the difficulty of obtaining the 
additional information necessary for the review and the characteristics of 
the provisional SPS measure.”93 Although the WTO SPS requirements had 
been in place only since the beginning of 1995 and the United States, as the 
complainant, had requested consultations only slightly more than two years 
after that, the Appellate Body concluded that this requirement was not 
satisfied because “collecting the necessary additional information would be 
relatively easy.”94 In Australia-Salmon, the Appellate Body observed that a 
measure adopted twenty years earlier “can . . . hardly be seen as a measure 
‘provisionally’ adopted.”95 
 In Japan-Apples, the Appellate Body addressed the somewhat more 
challenging question of the adequacy of the scientific evidence, as directed 
by the first sentence of Article 5.7.96 The United States, as complainant,  
argued that 200 years of studies and practical experience with fire blight 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. ¶ 91. 
 91. Id. ¶ 92. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. ¶ 93 (emphasis in original). 
 94. Id. This result is similar to that in the subsequent proceedings in EC-Hormones, in which 
the EC identified four years as a “reasonable period of time” for implementation of the Appellate Body’s 
report, so as to allow for further investigational studies and the adoption of necessary legislation. In a 
proceeding under article 21.3(c) of the DSU, an arbitrator rejected these arguments, noting that “[i]t 
would not be in keeping with the requirement of prompt compliance to include in the reasonable period 
of time, time to conduct studies or to consult experts to demonstrate the consistency of a measure 
already judged to be inconsistent.” Award of the Arbitrator, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), ¶¶ 38–39, WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13 (May 29, 1998) (emphasis in original). 
Although analytically distinct because this was not a situation governed by Article 5.7, the underlying 
policy motivation appears similar to that of the Appellate Body’s approach in Japan-Apples.  
 95. Australia-Salmon, supra note 78, ¶ 8.57. 
 96. Japan-Apples, supra note 80, ¶¶ 169–88. 
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already provided sufficient evidence to conclude that Article 5.7 was 
inapplicable and that the measure was consequently infirm by reference to 
the remainder of the SPS Agreement.97 The panel and the Appellate Body 
agreed, concluding that existing scientific evidence was sufficient to 
demonstrate the absence of the need for regulation, establishing a very 
narrow scope of accessibility to the provision indeed.98 
 Significantly, Japan argued that the panel’s interpretation of Article 5.7 
excluded what Japan referred to as “unresolved uncertainty,” or uncertainty 
that cannot be dispelled by scientific evidence.99 In response, the Appellate 
Body concluded without explanation that: 
 
The application of Article 5.7 is triggered not by the existence of 
scientific uncertainty, but rather by the insufficiency of scientific 
evidence . . . . The two concepts are not interchangeable. 
Therefore, we are unable to endorse Japan’s approach of 
interpreting Article 5.7 through the prism of “scientific 
uncertainty.”100 
 
 Japan also objected to the panel’s apparent conclusion that Article 5.7 
is inapplicable in cases in which some information is available but the 
available data do not resolve the question of policy-relevant science 
presented. “We do not read the Panel’s interpretation as excluding cases 
where the available evidence is more than minimal in quantity, but has not 
led to reliable or conclusive results,” responded the Appellate Body.101 
“Article 5.7 would be applicable to a situation where a lot of scientific 
research has been carried out on a particular issue without yielding reliable 
evidence.”102 
 While the jurisprudence under Article 5.7 is still evolving, some broad 
areas of divergence with normative statements urging precaution as a public 
policy are already apparent. First, the presumptions embedded in the two 
approaches are quite different from one another. The Appellate Body has 
stated that Article 5.7 should be available only as a narrowly crafted 
exception to justify a measure that otherwise would be subject to the SPS 
Agreement’s more rigorous requirements. By contrast, a precautionary 
perspective counsels the early adoption of policy measures to avert threats 
characterized by scientific uncertainty.  
                                                                                                                 
 97. See id. ¶¶ 61–67 (summarizing U.S. argument). 
 98. Id. ¶ 182. 
 99. Id. ¶ 33. 
 100. Id.¶ 184. 
 101. Id. ¶ 185. 
 102. Id.  
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 Second, the substantive scope of Article 5.7 is considerably narrower 
than normal standards for precaution. Although the difference between the 
two textual formulations may not be readily apparent, the Appellate Body’s 
clear distinction in Japan-Apples between sufficiency of scientific evidence 
as used in the text of Article 5.7 on the one hand, and scientific uncertainty 
addressed by precautionary methodologies on the other, plainly narrows the 
range of situations in which Article 5.7 might be available as a surrogate for 
precaution. In principle, uncertainty can be reduced or eliminated through 
further scientific inquiry. But a precautionary perspective acknowledges 
that some uncertainties may be irreducible or fundamental, in the sense that 
they cannot be removed relying on currently available scientific 
methodologies within a time frame commensurate with the need for 
regulatory intervention, and consequently counsels an early, proactive 
policy response nonetheless. 
 As the Appellate Body stressed in Japan-Apples, Article 5.7 by 
contrast speaks of an “insufficient” scientific predicate, a narrow subset of 
the lack of full scientific certainty addressed by a precautionary 
methodology, and allows a WTO member to maintain a measure relying on 
this provision only on an interim basis pending development of sufficient 
information.103 An alternative approach might have been to begin with the 
presumption, explicitly articulated in the SPS Agreement, that WTO 
Members have a right to adopt and apply sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, which would translate into a presumption of validity. This 
interpretive approach in turn might have led to somewhat greater receptivity 
to the application of Article 5.7 under less rigorous conditions, and for a 
longer period. 
 Third, as highlighted in Japan-Varietals, for a measure to be justified 
by Article 5.7 a Member must collect more scientific information until the 
scientific basis for the action can be determined to be either sufficient—in 
which case the measure may presumably be maintained indefinitely—or 
inadequate—in which case it must presumably be removed, in both 
instances consistent with the requirements of the remainder of the SPS 
Agreement. Consequently, the provision is at most a temporary “safe 
harbor” pending further scientific investigation. Article 5.7 says nothing 
about a third, and very real, possibility involving fundamental or irreducible 
uncertainties, a situation expressly anticipated by a precautionary 
methodology. In any event, the Appellate Body has not yet found a measure 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. ¶ 176. 
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to be justified by Article 5.7 despite litigation of this question in the two 
Japanese SPS disputes.104  
D.  The GMO Dispute 
 A fifth major dispute in which precaution, or Article 5.7, or both, were 
litigated under the SPS Agreement was a challenge initiated by the United 
States, Canada, and Argentina to the EC’s de facto moratorium, maintained 
between 1999 and 2003,  on the importation of genetically engineered crops 
and foods.105 The EC scheme requires prior governmental authorization 
before a GMO may be “plac[ed] on the market.”106 This structure is 
common to regulatory schemes in place in many WTO member countries 
for such substances as drugs, food additives, and pesticides, but the 
implications for WTO rules of such an approach had not been considered 
earlier in WTO dispute settlement processes. The EC framework for 
approving GMOs is typical in requiring a private party applicant, such as a 
manufacturer, to demonstrate that the substance meets a test of safety or the 
absence of adverse effects.  
1. Community-Level Actions 
 Before taking up the arguments of the complaining parties, the panel’s 
report107 considered the relevance of extrinsic authorities, including the UN 
                                                                                                                 
 104.  But see Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the 
EC-Hormones Dispute, ¶¶ 674-735, WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008). After modifying the measures 
challenged in EC-Hormones, supra note 56, by substituting a provisional ban for five of the six 
hormones at issue in that dispute, the EC initiated a dispute settlement proceeding against the United 
States and Canada objecting to the continued maintenance of sanctions. Id. The Appellate Body, citing 
“numerous flaws . . . in the Panel’s analysis” of the application Article 5.7, reversed the Panel’s finding 
that a “critical mass” of new scientific evidence was necessary to satisfy that provision’s requirement of 
“insufficiency”; concluded that the Panel had misallocated the burden of proof under that article; and 
found that the Panel had applied an incorrect test in interpreting its requirements. Id. ¶ 735. Because of 
the inadequacy of the Panel’s analysis, the Appellate Body concluded that it was unable to determine the 
applicability of Article 5.7. Id. 
 105. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, ¶ 4.10, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DR293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter EC-
GMOs]. 
 106. Council Directive 2001/18 art. 1, 2001 O.J. (L 106/1) 4 (EC) (defining “placing on the 
market” as “making available to third parties, whether in return for payment or free of charge”); see also 
David A. Wirth, The Transatlantic GMO Dispute Against the European Communities: Some 
Preliminary Thoughts, in EU AND WTO LAW: HOW TIGHT IS THE LEGAL STRAITJACKET FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCT REGULATION? 175, 177–180 (M. Pallemaerts ed., 2006) (providing a more 
detailed discussion of the EC scheme at issue in this dispute). 
 107. EC-GMOs, supra note 105, ¶ 7.73. In November 2006, the Commission decided not to 
appeal the panel’s report to the WTO Appellate Body because the moratorium was terminated by 2004 
1178 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 37:1153 
 
Biodiversity Convention, the Biosafety Protocol to that instrument, and the 
precautionary principle. The panel found that, because the United States had 
signed but not ratified the Biodiversity Convention and consequently is not 
a party to it, that agreement is not “applicable” to relations among those 
WTO members.108 Argentina and Canada signed the Biosafety Protocol but 
have not yet ratified, and the United States has not signed the agreement. 
Consequently, none are parties to the Protocol and it, too, is inapplicable to 
the dispute.109 
 The EC vigorously asserted the application of the precautionary 
principle and the complainants forcefully denied that precaution has any 
legal content or relevance. The panel first recalled the Appellate Body’s 
treatment of precaution in the EC-Hormones dispute.110 The panel then 
addressed the status of precaution in international law, concluding that, as 
the Appellate Body had found in 1998, there is no standard formulation for 
the principle and that the question of its legal force “remains unsettled.”111 
In light of this, the panel stated that there was no need to address the matter 
in greater detail because the precautionary principle did not apply to the 
dispute as a general matter and it was irrelevant to the task of adjudicating 
the rights and obligations of the disputing parties.112  
 Although the precautionary principle as such may not have been 
applicable to the legal claims before the panel, a prior approval scheme by 
its very structure contains elements of precaution. Requirements for prior 
governmental approval serve a gatekeeping function by shifting the burden 
onto the proponent of a product, substance, or process to justify the 
approval sought, usually by reference to a predetermined test or criterion. 
Before or pending approval, the action for which the approval must be 
                                                                                                                 
and the regulatory provisions at issue in the dispute are not affected by the panel’s report. As of this 
writing there is some potential, as yet unclear, for the EC’s traceability and labeling requirements to give 
rise to a second dispute over biotech foods and crops. The Codex Alimentarius has made efforts to 
harmonize GM food labeling.  See generally Jack A. Bobo, Two Decades of GE Food Labeling Debate 
Draw to an End—Will Anybody Notice?, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 251 (2012) (examining the compilation of 
labeling guidance created by a commission outside the WTO and the SPS agreement). 
 108. EC-GMOs, supra note 105, ¶ 7.74. The panel’s conclusion concerning the Biodiversity 
Convention, to which Argentina, Canada and the EC are parties, appears to be an application of WTO 
law and not purely a question of treaty interpretation. See Vienna Convention, supra note 67, art. 30 
(declaring that application of successive treaties on the same subject matter to be presumed unless the 
agreements are "incompatible" with each other).   
 109. EC-GMOs, supra note 105, ¶ 7.75.  
 110. Id. ¶¶ 7.78–7.88. 
 111. Id. ¶ 7.89. The panel found that the status of the precautionary principle had not changed in 
the time between the Appellate Body’s report in EC-Hormones and the panel’s report in EC-GMOs. Id. 
¶ 7.88. 
 112. Id. ¶ 7.3211 (discussing that there is no need to examine precautionary principle as such in 
review of national-level safeguard measures under Article 5.7).  
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granted is ordinarily prohibited. For that reason, requirements for prior 
governmental approval are regulatory tools which by their very structure 
express a public policy preference for erring on the side of caution, and are 
consequently inherently precautionary.113 Because the default option in such 
a scheme is to prohibit market entry in the absence of affirmative 
governmental action, of necessity there will be no exposure to risks from a 
product, substance, or process for which approval is required until the 
approval is granted. The purpose of the application process is to clarify the 
nature of the risks, if any, often through a process of give-and-take between 
the applicant and governmental authorities as in, for instance, requests for 
more studies or further information. Not surprisingly, one of the EC 
directives at issue in the dispute expressly invokes the precautionary 
principle.114  
 The principal discipline in Annex C of the SPS Agreement relevant to 
prior approval schemes, such as the EC’s for GMOs, is a prohibition on 
“undue delay.”115 The interaction between this discipline and domestic 
regulatory requirements quite obviously has the potential to alter the 
dynamics between governmental officials and private sector applicants in 
the implementation of a prior approval scheme. It is not infrequent in the 
context of prior approval schemes for governmental authorities to request 
more information from the applicant. If that causes delay in the final 
approval, as it may well, then the question becomes whether the delay is 
“undue”—that is, related to a legitimate public policy goal on the one hand 
or a pretext for abuse on the other. Presumably, inordinate foot-dragging in 
processing an application could also amount to “undue” delay. The 
appropriateness of a precautionary perspective in drawing this line 
consequently could be expected to be an element in the interpretation of the 
extent to which delay is “undue.” At least under some circumstances, 
determining whether an approval process has resulted in “delay”—a term 
which by its plain meaning invites a conclusion of abuse—that is “undue” 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See, e.g., Helle Tegner Anker & Margaret Rosso Grossman, Authorization of Genetically 
Modified Organisms: Precaution in US and EC Law, 3 EUR. FOOD & FEED L.R. 3 (2009). 
 114. Council Directive 2001/18, supra note 106, arts. 1 & 4(1). 
 115. SPS Agreement, supra note 48, at 82 ¶ 1(a) (“Members shall ensure, with respect to any 
procedure to check and ensure the fulfilment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that: (a) such 
procedures are undertaken and completed without undue delay and in no less favourable manner for 
imported products than for like domestic products[.]”). A strict reading of the introductory language, 
which limits this requirement to "any procedure to check and ensure . . . the fulfillment of sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures," might very well lead to the conclusion that this discipline is inapplicable by its 
terms. A prior approval scheme, strictly speaking, is not designed to "check and ensure . . . the 
fulfillment of" a normative standard in an enforcement mode; rather a prior approval scheme is itself a 
normative process in which a governmental authority is requested to determine the appropriateness of 
entry into commerce. 
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could raise delicate questions concerning review of the scientific rationale 
for the length of time required by governmental authorities to reach a 
conclusion. 
 In response to a political agreement in the EC to amend the 1990 
directive governing GMO approval procedures, five EC Member States—
Denmark, Greece, France, Italy, and Luxembourg—in 1999 issued a joint 
statement expressing concern about the adequacy of the new legislation and 
announcing that “in accordance with preventive and precautionary 
principles, they will take steps to have any new authorizations for growing 
and placing on the market suspended.”116 Another group of seven Member 
States—Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and 
Sweden—stated its intention “to take a thoroughly precautionary approach 
in dealing with applications and authorizations.”117 The Group of Five’s 
statement resulted in an across-the-board moratorium, whereas the Group of 
Seven announced an objective of rigorously reviewing applications on a 
case-by-case basis by reference to precautionary approaches. 
 The complaining parties objected to the blanket moratorium as well as 
to the EC’s treatment of individual applications.118 The panel rejected the 
argument that the general moratorium was a “measure” for the purposes of 
the SPS Agreement, because the pending applications had not been the 
result of a final official action such as approval or disapproval.119 The panel 
then went on to examine the consistency of the moratorium with the other 
requirements of the SPS Agreement, most notably the provision prohibiting 
“undue delay.”120 As part of that analysis, the panel took up the question of 
whether precautionary perspectives, as identified by both groups of 
countries but with different operative effects, might justify the general de 
facto moratorium.121  
 In addressing this question, the panel first noted that the SPS discipline 
proscribing undue delay “does not preclude the application of a prudent and 
precautionary approach.”122 The panel stated that the appropriateness of a 
particular action, such as a request for additional information, would be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, “in the light of all relevant facts and 
circumstances.”123 As a general matter, however, the panel opined that:  
 
                                                                                                                 
 116. EC-GMOs, supra note 105, ¶ 7.474. 
 117. Id. ¶ 7.484. 
 118. Id. ¶ 7.98. 
 119. Id. ¶ 7.1613. 
 120. Id. ¶¶ 7.1466, 7.1503. 
 121. Id. ¶ 7.3220 
 122. Id. ¶ 7.1522. 
 123. Id.  
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It is quite possible that . . . where science evolves and there is 
limited available scientific evidence, a deferral of substantive 
decisions might allow for better decisions at a later point in time, 
provided that appropriate analyses and research are undertaken. 
However, we do not consider that [the SPS discipline prohibiting 
undue delay] can or should be interpreted to allow Members to 
go into a sort of holding pattern while they or other entities 
undertake research with a view to obtaining additional scientific 
information and data.124 
 
Consequently, “evolving science, scientific complexity and uncertainty, and 
limited available scientific information or data are not, in and of 
themselves, grounds for delaying substantive approval decisions.”125 In 
such a situation, observed the panel, Article 5.7 might be available to 
support a measure implemented on a provisional basis.126 
 In the end the panel concluded that twenty-four of the twenty-seven 
challenged applications at the EC level had resulted in “undue delay.”127 
This required the panel to examine the facts and circumstances of each 
application individually, explicitly reviewing the scientific rationale for the 
alleged delay in each instance,128 and impliedly engaging with principles of 
precautionary decision-making in undertaking that analysis. Because the 
EC-level applications were not “measures,” Article 5.7 was not explicitly 
part of that analysis. 
2. National Safeguard Measures  
 The complaining parties also challenged nine national-level measures 
maintained by the EC Member States of Austria, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, and Luxembourg as so-called “safeguard measures” under the 
relevant directives. These provisions in the directives permit an EC Member 
State to restrict or prohibit use or sale in its territory, even after 
authorization is given at the EC level, if a Member State nonetheless 
believes that the GMO in question may pose a risk to health or the 
environment. As with the approval process at the Community level, the EC 
invoked Article 5.7 as a justification for these national measures. 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Id. ¶ 7.1527. 
 125. Id. ¶ 7.1526. 
         126.   Id. ¶ 7.1527. 
 127. Id. ¶ 8.7. 
 128. Cf. Antonia Eliason, Science Versus Law in WTO Jurisprudence: The (Mis)Interpretation 
of the Scientific Process and the (In)Sufficiency of Scientific Evidence in EC-Biotech, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 341, 344 (2009) (discussing Appellate Body review as focused on issues of law, with limited 
capacity to review facts or scientific determinations made by panels). 
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 By contrast with the EC-level applications, the Member State 
safeguard prohibitions as a matter of form qualified as “measures” as that 
term is used in the SPS Agreement, because they had resulted in final 
actions in the form of prohibitions on use. In view of the EC’s 
characterization of the safeguard measures as “provisional,” the first 
question addressed by the panel consequently was the test for the threshold 
applicability of Article 5.7.129 The procedural posture of the Member State-
level safeguard measures consequently led the panel to articulate in greater 
detail the requirements of Article 5.7 than was called for by the panel’s 
characterization of the applications considered at the EC level. 
 Relying on language from the two Japanese quarantine cases, the panel 
concluded that the trigger for applicability of Article 5.7 was not the 
characterization of the measure as provisional by the WTO Member State, 
but, rather, insufficiency of the scientific evidence.130 In other words, the 
availability of Article 5.7 depends not on how the WTO Member State 
describes the measure, but on the state of scientific evidence as determined 
by the panel itself. 
 The panel then went on to examine the relationship between Article 5.7 
on the one hand and Articles 2.2 and 5.1 on the other, which specify that 
SPS measures must be “based on scientific principles[,] . . . not maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence” and be “based on” a risk assessment, 
respectively.131 After a lengthy exegesis, the panel concluded that Article 
5.7 is a “qualified right” for a WTO Member temporarily to maintain a 
measure that does not satisfy Article 5.1’s requirement of a risk 
assessment.132 Once Article 5.7 is invoked, stated the panel, the burden is 
on the complaining party to establish that any one of the four requirements 
for application of Article 5.7 is not satisfied.133 After that, the burden shifts 
back to the responding party, which must demonstrate that all the demands 
of Article 5.7 have been met.134 In situations where the requirements of 
Article 5.7 are not satisfied, the remainder of the SPS Agreement, including 
Articles 2.2 and 5.1, applies to the measure.135 The analysis commences 
with an examination of the measure’s consistency with Article 5.1, and it is 
                                                                                                                 
 129. EC-GMOs, supra note 105, ¶¶ 4.373–4.374. 
 130. Id. ¶¶ 7.2939–2.994. 
 131. Id. ¶¶ 7.3027, 7.3031 n. 1867. 
 132. Id. ¶ 7.3004. 
 133. Id. ¶ 7.3006. Cf. text supra note 89 (discussing test for application of Article 5.7 set out in 
Japan-Varietals). 
 134. Id. ¶ 7.3218–19. 
 135. See id. ¶ 4.631 (analyzing article 5.7 as an exception to articles 2.2 and 5.1). 
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only after a conclusion that Article 5.1 is not satisfied that consideration of 
Article 5.7 is necessary.136 
 The panel then applied this analytical framework to the nine challenged 
safeguard measures maintained by the six EC Member States. First, the 
panel decided that in determining the extent to which available science is 
“insufficient” as a condition precedent to the application of Article 5.7, a 
WTO Member’s choice of appropriate level of protection (ALOP) is 
irrelevant.137 Second, the appropriate temporal juncture for assessing the 
sufficiency of the scientific evidence for the purposes of Article 5.7 is at the 
time the measure is adopted.138 After resolving these generic questions, the 
panel concluded that none of the challenged measures were justified by 
reference to Article 5.7 because the scientific evidence in each case was 
sufficient to determine that the measure was not warranted.139  
IV.  CONCLUSION: RECONCILING PRECAUTION AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 
 The central conundrum of the SPS agreement is the intrusiveness of 
panel review of domestic, presumably expert, judgments with respect to 
policy-relevant science. If review by a WTO dispute settlement panel is too 
cursory, the Agreement will not perform its intended purpose: to provide 
for international scrutiny of an allegedly protectionist trade barrier. On the 
other hand, excessive zeal by panels in revisiting the scientific predicate for 
a national regulatory measure can begin to look like international intrusion 
into a state’s intrinsic sovereign prerogatives to protect health, safety, and 
the environment. In the development of SPS jurisprudence, these 
considerations have played out in a variety of related guises. These include 
questions familiar in post-hoc, third-party review of scientific and technical 
data, questions, and judgments, including burden of proof,140 standard of 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. ¶ 7.3215.  
 137. Id. ¶ 7.3246. 
 138. Id. ¶ 7.3255. 
 139. Id. ¶ 8.9. 
 140. See EC-Hormones, supra note 56, ¶¶ 97–109 (discussing the burden on the challenging 
party to establish a prima facie case of violation, after which the burden shifts to responding party to 
defend by reference to science-based disciplines). 
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review,141 and deference to the judgment of national decision-making 
authorities.142 
 If those questions are not daunting enough, the SPS Agreement also 
raises a host of other epistemological issues associated with the 
adjudication of scientific questions in an adversarial setting:143 To what 
extent, if any, is it possible to appeal to science as a value-neutral arbiter of 
public policy disputes, such as the EU hormone and GMO bans?144 To what 
extent is it possible to identify a particular methodology as “scientific” or 
not? To what extent is it possible to adjudicate questions of scientific “fact” 
in an adversarial setting?145 What is the appropriate treatment of minority 
scientific views in an adjudicatory, adversarial setting? Are tests designed 
to prevent abuses of agricultural quarantines intended to protect 
commercially important plant and animal species also appropriate for 
measures to protect human health from contaminants in food (e.g., EU-
Hormones), and vice versa? What is the optimal procedure for lay 
adjudicators to collect policy-relevant scientific information from technical 
experts?146 
 To phrase the issue in the manner in which it demonstrates the greatest 
concern for the integrity of the trade regime, among those challenges is how 
to identify abuses of precautionary decision-making. The GMO dispute 
raises this question, already inherent in the very structure of free trade 
agreements,147 in the starkest possible terms.148 A prior approval scheme, 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Id. ¶¶ 110–19 (stating that panels should engage in “objective assessment of the facts”— 
i.e., science). By contrast, the standard of review to be applied by the Appellate Body in reviewing a 
panel’s determination is to ascertain whether the panel engaged in “wilful distortion or 
misrepresentation” of the facts or science, or “an egregious error that calls into question the good faith of 
a panel.” Id. ¶ 133. 
 142. Id.¶¶ 110–19. 
 143. See generally Markus Wagner, Law Talk v. Science Talk: The Languages of Law and 
Science in WTO Proceedings, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 154 (2011) (describing the role of science in the 
SPS Agreement). 
 144. See, e.g., Vern R. Walker, The Myth of Science as a “Neutral Arbiter” for Triggering 
Precautions, 26 B.C. COMP. & INT’L L. REV. 197, 197 (2003) (arguing “science cannot be a ‘neutral 
arbiter’ for triggering precautionary measures”).  
 145. See, e.g., CAROLINE FOSTER, SCIENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2011) (explaining that committees usually assess scientific 
matters, precluding the need for judicial review). 
 146. See Eric Gillman, Making WTO SPS Dispute Settlement Work: Challenges and Practical 
Solutions, 31 N.W.J. INT’L L. & BUS. 439, 463–71 (2011) (discussing the role of experts in SPS 
disputes); Joost Pauwelyn, The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 325 
(2002) (discussing the importance of experts in WTO dispute settlement).  
 147. See Section III, supra.  
 148. See generally David Winickoff et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and 
Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 81 (2005) (discussing objections to European 
Union actions preventing the importation of genetically modified crops and food products). 
 
2013]    The WTO Dispute Concerning Genetically Modified Organisms 1185 
 
such as the EC’s for GMOs, is by its very nature skewed toward 
precautionary outcomes because it places the burden on the proponent of a 
product to demonstrate safety, the absence of harm, or whatever other test 
the governmental decision-maker is instructed to employ. It is difficult to 
question as a matter of principle the inherent legitimacy of prior approval 
schemes, given their extensive use by a variety of states. But it is important 
to note that in the absence of an actual, affirmative authorization, a prior 
approval scheme inherently generates the result “not yet” as opposed to 
“no.” Assuming that the regulatory structure is operating in good faith, the 
proponent of a product is always free to generate more data to support 
approval. As is almost painfully evident from the report of the panel in EU-
GMOs, the SPS agreement and its discipline of “undue delay” inevitably 
involves intrusive review of sensitive, presumably expert, scientific 
judgments not as to whether a product should be approved, but whether 
more information about it is appropriate before a decision is made – exactly 
the realm of precaution. 
 Precaution, then, continues to present complex and unique challenges 
to the law of international trade. As the coverage of trade agreements 
expands to reach nondiscriminatory public policy measures designed to 
further other social welfare goals, tensions between those purposes and the 
aim of trade liberalization tend to become apparent. Norms of precaution, 
whether binding or not, exhorting states to act or refrain from acting in the 
face of uncertainty, present particular difficulties because in a trade 
agreement dispute settlement proceeding they appear to be pretexts for 
protectionism. The natural tendency then is to approach the question as a 
zero-sum clash between precaution and the trade disciplines, with an 
overemphasis on one necessarily attenuating the vigor of the other. An 
adjudicatory, adversarial setting in which the validity of a measure is 
resolved at a particular moment—attributes that do not necessarily create a 
productive interface with protocols of scientific inquiry—further 
exacerbates the potential for conflict. 
 The panel in EC-GMOs elucidated this perspective, emphasizing the 
costs associated with tradeoffs between the trade disciplines and other 
social welfare policies with exquisite clarity. “[I]t is clear,” stated the panel, 
“that application of a prudent and precautionary approach is, and must be, 
subject to reasonable limits, lest the precautionary approach swallow the 
discipline imposed by” the SPS Agreement.149 The need for closure in 
adjudicating the rights and obligations of WTO Members trumps precaution 
in reviewing the irreversible process of releasing GMOs to the environment 
                                                                                                                 
 149.  EC-GMOs, supra note 105, ¶ 7.1523.  
1186 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 37:1153 
 
because it is not permissible for “Members to go into a sort of holding 
pattern while they or other entities undertake research with a view to 
obtaining additional scientific information and data.”150 This interpretation 
of the SPS Agreement, and particularly Article 5.7, facilitates a crisp and 
final adjudication of WTO Members’ rights, but it is far from apparent that 
this approach is responsive to the real-world regulatory milieu that 
frequently presents challenging and muddy questions of public policy. 
 The WTO dispute settlement mechanism has declined to grapple with 
these weighty issues, instead eliminating precaution as a legitimate basis for 
governmental decision-making from consideration altogether, further 
reinforcing that result with an extraordinarily ungenerous interpretation of 
Article 5.7 of the Agreement. The difficult question of precaution in 
international trade law might benefit instead from a different entry point to 
the problem. The WTO has become a forum for an international discussion 
of appropriate approaches to regulation. This is particularly apparent in the 
context of the SPS Agreement, but Appellate Body disputes involving the 
basic GATT disciplines of non-discrimination151 demonstrate that the 
question can arise elsewhere in the WTO suite of agreements as well. The 
question then is the appropriateness of precaution as a component of a 
governmental regulatory process. While the precise outlines of a 
precautionary approach may be less well-established than protocols for risk 
assessment, precaution is well nigh universally accepted as a public policy 
approach, including in the states that have been challenging parties in the 
SPS cases. While the Appellate Body and the GMO panel speak as if 
precaution were a separate body of law existing in an alternate universe, the 
100 heads of state or government that adopted the Rio Declaration are 
representatives of the same states that are Members of the WTO. It is no 
coincidence that it is only in the context of international trade, and in 
particular the potential for restricting market access, that precaution is 
routinely assailed as a potentially counterproductive policy. 
 Trade disputes over regulatory measures, such as the beef hormone ban 
or genetically engineered foods and crops, are often byproducts or artifacts 
of more fundamental differences in regulatory approaches and philosophy 
among states. The EC’s continued refusal to abandon the hormone ban 
despite WTO-authorized sanctions,152 one of the longest ongoing disputes 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. ¶ 7.1527. 
 151. E.g., Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 
151, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007). 
 152. The United States and the EC agreed on a settlement of the dispute only in 2009, more than 
a decade after the Appellate Body’s report. See Joint Communication from the European Communities 
& United States, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/28 (Sept. 30, 2009). 
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in WTO history, is concrete evidence of the intensity of public sentiment on 
sensitive public policy issues like food safety. The WTO disciplines, and 
most notably the SPS Agreement, are an attempt to cabin and constrain 
public policy decisions by discouraging states from proceeding with and 
maintaining the most absurd, outlier public policies. Precautionary 
approaches are now sufficiently well accepted internationally that they fall 
well within the range of the minimally acceptable.  
 If precaution is widely accepted as a legitimate approach to crafting 
public policy, the WTO can ill afford to ignore that perspective in its 
jurisprudence. Otherwise, the very disciplines that are intended to establish 
minimum standards for sound approaches to regulation risk diverging from 
good practice standards established outside the trade context. By virtue of 
the SPS Agreement, the WTO has become arguably the single most 
important international forum for addressing philosophies of regulation. By 
treating precaution as if it exists in another dimension, distinct from the 
trade-based disciplines, the WTO dispute settlement process risks distorting 
regulatory decision-making even in areas that have no adverse implications 
for international trade. 
 While there may be disagreements about their underlying utility, the 
public policy measures at issue in trade disputes with scientific overtones 
have invariably been adopted by public authorities after considerable 
deliberation. In at least some national settings, that would counsel hesitancy 
on the part of reviewing authorities like courts to disrupt or reconsider 
decisions of public authorities on technical scientific questions. A measure 
of deference on such questions as national determinations as to the 
sufficiency of scientific information would be an analytical mechanism for 
dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body to reconcile apparently 
competing policy visions. The Appellate Body’s expansive and inclusive 
definition of a risk assessment in EC-Hormones,153 presumably so as to 
encompass a variety of national-level approaches, is an example of such a 
deferential interpretation. A presumption of good faith on the part of 
governmental authorities could similarly create an appropriately 
circumspect perspective in the international review of science-based 
measures based in part on precautionary methodologies. 
 These considerations suggest the utility of an attempt by the Appellate 
Body to harmonize what may at first appear to be competing public policies 
such as the SPS disciplines and precaution. To that extent, statements such 
as the Appellate Body’s holding in Japan-Apples that scientific uncertainty 
                                                                                                                 
 153. EC-Hormones, supra note 56, ¶¶ 187 & 198 (stating risk assessment need not be 
quantitative or “come to a monolithic conclusion”). 
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and sufficiency of scientific evidence are different concepts for the purposes 
of SPS Article 5.7 are missed opportunities at best. The larger trajectory of 
Appellate Body jurisprudence is instructive in suggesting greater receptivity 
to environment, natural resources, and public health concerns by relaxing 
the strictures of the trade-based disciplines.154 As the Appellate Body’s own 
jurisprudence has demonstrated, it is not just possible but desirable to 
reconcile potentially competing public policies with the goals of trade 
liberalization through the vehicle of the trade agreement dispute settlement 
process. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 154. E.g., U.S.-Shrimps, supra note 70; see also Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 114, 192 
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) (concluding that asbestos and alternatives to it are not “like products” 
for purposes of national treatment discipline by virtue of differences in toxicity). 
 
